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Abstract: Though the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) has
failed, the original draft is likely to serve as a basis for future negotiations.
This article gives a critical assessment of the draft from an industrial eco-
nomics point of view. First, I summarize the contents of the agreement which
is relevant for market structure and competition. Then I develop the indus-
trial economics approach, which serves as a basis for criticism. I conclude
that a multilateral agreement on investment should (i) recognize competition
concerns, (ii) give a suitable deﬁnition of investment, and (iii) should help to
establish competition authorities in less developed countries.
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Critical Assessment of the MAI Andreas Polk
1 Introduction
Negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the
OECD failed in 1998. This failure does not imply that eﬀorts to regulate
direct investment ﬂows on a multilateral basis have come to an end. Instead,
it can be expected that a general multilateral framework on investment will
substitute for the multiplicity of existing bilateral agreements in the future.1
The negotiations on the MAI indicate the form of such a future framework.
Several working papers present and criticize the contents of the MAI.2 But
an assessment from an industrial economics point of view has not yet been
made. In the following, I will give such an assessment. I conclude that a
comprehensive liberalization of direct investment ﬂows only makes sense if
strong competition authorities exist, which are able to ensure eﬀective compe-
tition. In order to develop its positive eﬀects also in less developed countries
(LDCs), it is essential that a future agreement accompanies the implementa-
tion of eﬀective competition authorities in these countries. Moreover, the term
”investment” needs closer speciﬁcation in a multilateral agreement. The MAI
entirely ignores these aspects.
This article deals also with the question which institution should implement
a future multilateral agreement on investment. The WTO and OECD play
an important role in this context: Due to their high worldwide share of direct
investment, OECD countries have a strong interest to liberalize investment
ﬂows. Up to now, the regulatory framework of the OECD comprise regu-
lations concerning hidden investment barriers, the free ﬂow of capital, and
general guidelines for multinational enterprizes.3 These regulations have three
fundamental disadvantages: First, they do not cover all areas which are rel-
evant for investment ﬂows. Second, the agreements do not represent a real
multilateral framework. They refer only to the member states of the OECD.
Third, the contents of the agreements are not binding. Accordingly, the OECD
has no eﬀective dispute settlement body, which assures compliance to existing
rules.
In contrast, the WTO can be regarded as a real multilateral organization.
It contains two agreements that pertain to foreign direct investment: The
1Compare UNCTAD (1998a).
2Compare e.g. Hartwig (1999), Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn (1998), Polk (1999), Singer
and Stumberg (1999).
3The existing regulations within the OECD refer to the ”The Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises” (OECD 2000a), ”The OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises” (OECD 2000b), and the Codices of ”Liberalisation of Capital
Movements” (OECD 2001a) and ”Current Invisible Operations” (OECD 2001b). Compare
Polk (1999) for a detailed presentation of these OECD agreements. Investment related
agreements of the WTO are also presented in this paper.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is an additional
agreement to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade). It states
that member countries of the WTO are not allowed to implement investment
barriers which form a possible obstacle towards trade. The General Agreement
on Trades in Services (GATS) also contains some minor investment related
regulations.4 But both agreements are limited to the scope of the WTO. A
comprehensive regulation of investment ﬂows, which is independent of trade
political concerns, has not yet been established within the WTO.5 I will argue
that the WTO is a good forum for a future multilateral investment agreement.
This contribution has the following structure: Section 2 describes the regula-
tions of the MAI which aﬀect market structure and competition. Section 3
introduces arguments from an industrial economics point of view, which lead
to my propositions in section 4. Section 5 discusses the WTO as a possible
forum for a future multilateral agreement and concludes.
2 Presentation of the relevant MAI regula-
tions
The basic contents of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment are:
• The National Treatment Principle.
• The Most Favored Nation Principle.
• Rules concerning protection of investors against expropriation.
• A dispute settling procedure.
Several authors discuss and critically evaluate the contents of the MAI.6 I
will restrict the following discussion to two important aspects, which concern
competition policy.
Deﬁnition of the term ”Investment”
4For an overview of these regulations, see Polk (1999). Grimwade (1996), Senti (1999),
Trebilcock and Howse (1995) and WTO (1999) give a general overview of the regulatory
framework of the WTO.
5The question whether a multilateral agreement on investment is generally desirable is
not dealt with in this context. I will instead indicate which regulations should be altered
if an agreement like the MAI is be installed in the future. For this approach compare also
Ganesan (1998).
6Compare for instance Hartwig (1999), Polk (1999).
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The deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” determines the scope of the agreement
and is therefore of great importance. The deﬁnition of the MAI does not
diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of foreign investment.7 Strictly speaking,
the agreement does not only cover direct investment, which involves a long term
relationship and control of a resident entity in one economy.8 Rather, scope
is more general: It comprises any kind of engagement of a foreign investor.
For instance, what deﬁnes an investment is independent of the question if
the investor exercises control over the investment. Nor does it presuppose
that the investor engages in a long term relationship. Stated positively, any
investment which entails the economic performance of a natural or legal person
falls under the scope of the MAI. Such activities include portfolio investments,
which may be undertaken for short term gains or risk diversiﬁcation purposes.
Moreover, the acquisition of companies, shares or similar equities, debentures,
intellectual property rights, licences or other movable properties also fall under
the deﬁnition of the MAI. The same applies to investment which is related to
the privatization of state owned properties, or for the allocation of concessions.9
Furthermore, the agreement does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent kinds of
foreign investment, as for instance acquisitions of ﬁrms, mergers, new founda-
tions of plant locations, or acquisitions of minority stakes. The eﬀect of an
investment on market structure and the degree of competition depends much
on its type: If a direct investment is made in form of a merger or an acquisition,
it has diﬀerent eﬀects on competition than e.g. the foundation of a new plant
location. Beside its type, the kind of control exercised with the investment
plays an important role. If a foreign investment consists for instance of a co-
operation in research and development activities (R&D), other welfare eﬀects
can be expected compared to a horizontal take-over of a competitor.
In sum, the deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” in the MAI is too general.
It does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent forms of investments, between long
term and short term engagements, and between diﬀerent types of control. This
is relevant for the eﬀect on market structure and competition, as will be further
laid out in section 3.
Eﬀects on regional competition
The contents of the MAI weaken the bargaining position of governments to-
wards multinational enterprizes. The common practice is that governments
sanction concrete investment projects of foreign ﬁrms. The MAI forbids such
individual concession procedures: It allows a country to stipulate general con-
ditions for investments, as long as they do not discriminate foreign investors
7OECD (1998b), Section II, Definitions.
8For a close deﬁnition of foreign direct investment in this sense compare UNCTAD (2001),
Annex B, A.2.
9OECD (1998a), Section III, Privatisation.
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against domestic ones. The principles of national treatment and the most fa-
vored nation principle imply that a member state has to treat foreign investors
in the same way as domestic ones. Individual investment requirements, which
possibly imply a discrimination against other domestic or foreign investment,
are forbidden.10 This mechanism implies a complete and general opening of
domestic markets for foreign investment ﬂows.
This complete liberalization of investment ﬂows does not only refer to en-
gagements of MAI member states. Rather, it grants access investors from all
countries, independent of their MAI membership. In addition, the treaty ex-
plicitly prohibits certain popular conditions on foreign direct investment, such
as for instance local content requirements, minimum export contingencies or
minimum expenditure requirements for R&D.
The MAI foresees one exemption to the principle of national treatment: Re-
member that the treaty forbids negative discrimination of foreign investors
against domestic ﬁrms. But it explicitly permits positive discrimination of
foreign ﬁrms. Positive discrimination is a preferential treatment of foreign
investment vis a vis domestic ﬁrms. This rule, in connection with the most
favored nation principle, implies a second rule. If a country grants a particu-
lar concession to a foreign investor, it is bound to grant this concession also
to comparable investments in the future. These rules weaken the bargaining
positions of national governments vis a vis investors essentially. I present the
implications in the following section.
3 An evaluation of the MAI from an industrial
economics point of view
Multinational enterprizes are present in oligopolistic markets, which are char-
acterized by a high degree of market concentration.11 The existence of trans-
action costs is crucial for the emergence of multinational enterprizes: If trans-
action costs in markets are high compared to transaction costs within the ﬁrm,
ﬁrms gain through the internalization of trade within the ﬁrm organization,
which promotes the emergence of multinational ﬁrms.12
Vertically integrated multinational enterprizes can be expected in markets
where high switching costs between upstream and downstream ﬁrms exist. For
10OECD (1998a), Section III, National Treatment And Most Favored Nation
Treatment.
11Compare Horstman and Markusen (1987), Markusen (1984) or Helpman and Krugman
(1985).
12Dunning (1988), Chapter 1; Caves (1996), Chapter 4.
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instance, search costs of ﬁrms reduce incentives to trade intermediate goods
in a market. If a customer is not able to react to a change in market con-
ditions within a suitable amount of time, the supplier may take advantages
in negotiations. This may reduce a customer’s incentive to trade the good
in a market, and ineﬃciencies may occur. Internalization within a multina-
tional enterprize can avoid such problems. Another reason for the emergence
of vertically integrated multinational enterprizes is the importance of product
speciﬁc investments, which may cause a hold-up problem: Suppose that an
upstream and a downstream ﬁrm trade a good, the quality of which can be
improved by a speciﬁc investment of the upstream ﬁrm. Both ﬁrms beneﬁt
from the investment. Now suppose that the upstream ﬁrm invests and both
ﬁrms share the investment costs. Once the investment is done, costs are sunk.
The downstream ﬁrm is then able to beneﬁt from renegotiations. It knows
that the investment is speciﬁc and its value to the supplier is small if the latter
trades with other ﬁrms. Accordingly, the downstream ﬁrm can renegotiate
and impose a higher degree of the investment costs on the upstream ﬁrm. But
the upstream ﬁrm will anticipate this behavior ex ante, and its incentives to
invest decline. As a consequence, it invests less than is socially optimal, and
under investment results. A multinational enterprize may overcome this hold-
up problem through the internalization of transactions and investments within
a ﬁrm.
Horizontally integrated multinational enterprizes emerge in markets where
non-tradable assets play an important role. These are for instance R&D inten-
sive markets, or markets where organizational knowledge is a crucial factor.
Horizontally integrated multinational enterprizes may also emerge in markets
where marketing, brand names and the product mix plays an important role.
These assets can not, or only to a smaller extent, be traded over markets.
Internal organization within an enterprize may then provide a solution.
In sum, multinational enterprizes are mainly prevalent in oligopolistic mar-
kets where goods are diversiﬁed, or in markets where transaction costs within
ﬁrms tend to be small. Market entry barriers must play an important role, or
markets must be inferior institutions for trade of crucial assets. In contrast,
if entry barriers do not exist, potential domestic competitors are able to en-
ter the market; If trade upon markets is possible, the organization of trade
within ﬁrms is unnecessary. In these cases, incentives to organize production
in multinational ﬁrms are small.
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3.1 Market Concentration and the Pursuance of Market
Power
Multinational companies are present in oligopolistic markets. This indicates
that an industrial economics point of view is appropriate to analyze the con-
tents of the MAI: Which eﬀect does a general liberalization of foreign invest-
ment have on market structure and concentration? In particular, does market
concentration in host countries increase? And does increased market concen-
tration imply that multinational enterprizes can exercise market power more
easily? These questions are of interest, because a liberalization of foreign
investment may increase market concentration. As a consequence, multina-
tionals may exercise market power, which leads to negative welfare eﬀects.
But is this in fact the case? I discuss the relation between a liberalization of
foreign investment, market concentration, and the exercise of market power in
the following.
The relationship between market concentration and market power can be sum-
marized as follows:13 A high degree of market concentration exists if few com-
panies have a high share of market demand. The existence of market power
implies that companies take advantage of the high degree of market concen-
tration. If market power is exercised, ﬁrms increase proﬁts at the expense
of consumers and aggregate welfare. A high degree of market concentration
should therefore not be judged negatively per se. Only if a high degree of
concentration leads to the pursuance of market power, allocative ineﬃciencies
arise and aggregate welfare decreases.
Ineﬃciencies may arise in various forms: A company which exercises market
power may be able to set prices above marginal costs, which increases proﬁts.
Compared to ﬁrst best marginal cost pricing, equilibrium demand decreases
and aggregate welfare declines. This may go hand in hand with a second way
to exercise market power: If a ﬁrm realizes high markups and equilibrium
demand is low, incentives to invest in cost reducing technologies may be small.
The reason is that the beneﬁt of the investment may be relatively unimportant
if equilibrium demand is low. Moreover, a ﬁrm facing strong competition may
also have higher incentives to invest in cost reducing technologies, because the
cost reduction becomes more important if competition is strong. As a result,
marginal costs may be excessively high if competition is low. In this case, ﬁrms
underinvest in cost reducing-innovations, which decreases aggregate welfare.
Higher costs leads to higher consumer prices, and demand and welfare decline.
Thus, the pursuance of market power has negative welfare eﬀects, irrespective
13Compare Neven, Nuttall and Seabright (1993), Chapter 2, and Tirole (1988), Chapter
5. Scherer and Ross (1990), Chapter 11, explain measures for market concentration, such
as the Herﬁndahl-index and others.
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of the speciﬁc form it is exercised.
However, a high degree of concentration does not necessarily imply that ﬁrms
are able to exercise market power:
• If consumers can easily switch between diﬀerent products, a high degree
of market competition prevails, even if the number of ﬁrms is small. In
this case, a single company is not able to inﬂuence the market result no-
ticeably, because consumers substitute towards products of competitors
in case of a price increases. Competition between ﬁrms tends to be tough
if products are homogenous and consumers can easily substitute between
them. If goods are heterogenous, substitutability tends to be small and
ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to exercise market power.14
• Even though a single ﬁrm may not be able to exercise market power in
a speciﬁc market, ﬁrms may be able to coordinate and exercise market
power jointly. Competition laws forbid these practices, so explicit cartels
are rarely found.15 But ﬁrms may collude and exercise market power
implicitly. This is more likely if the number of companies is small and
the degree of concentration is high.16
Thus in itself, a high market share is not a reliable indicator that a ﬁrm exer-
cises market power. High prices are more likely if market demand is inelastic,
products are heterogenous, or coordination among ﬁrms is easy. But even then
high prices may not necessarily prevail. Suppose that market entry is possible
and potential competitors can enter the market at low costs. In this case in-
cumbent ﬁrms cannot set high prices, because high proﬁts makes entry more
attractive, which increases competition. Accordingly, markups may be small
even if market concentration is high. If a market is in fact contestable depends
on several other factors beside low entry costs. For instance, suppose that the
incumbent is able to adjust prices relatively fast in comparison to the time
scale of the investment. In this case incentives to enter a market decrease, be-
cause the potential entrant anticipates that the incumbent will decrease prices
as soon as he enters. In sum, whether a market is contestable depends on
various factors beside entry costs, and should be judged case by case.
Finally note that a high market share and an increase of market concentra-
tion may result from successful investments. If a ﬁrm invests in cost reducing
14Neven et al. (1993) show how these rather theoretical concepts can be applied in reality.
They introduce the concept of product speciﬁc ”relevant markets”, which describes the range
of substitutes for a good under consideration.
15The OPEC is an example of an explicit international cartel.
16Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) indicate that coordination is not possible in markets with
more than ﬁve ﬁrms.
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technologies or demand increasing product improvements, demand may switch
from competitors to that ﬁrm. The market share of the investing ﬁrm increases
and concentration rises. Increased concentration is then not the result of wel-
fare decreasing high markups, but welfare enhancing investments. Therefore,
a high degree of market concentration may be an indicator that some ﬁrms
are very eﬃcient, rather than exercising market power. All these arguments
indicate that a high degree of market concentration should not per se be con-
sidered as negative. One must decide case by case whether a high degree of
market concentration goes hand in hand with the exercise of market power.
What is the eﬀect of the MAI on competition? The MAI liberalizes foreign
investment. Its eﬀect on market concentration in the host countries is diﬃcult
to assess. Two opposite hypotheses seem plausible from a theoretical point of
view: Multinational enterprizes may ﬁnd it easier to overcome entry barriers
compared to national ﬁrms, for instance because ﬁnancial constraints are less
binding. This tends to increase the number of ﬁrms in a market, and market
concentration declines. If this is the case, liberalization of foreign investment
increases competition in host countries, and the exercise of market power is
less likely. Liberalization of foreign investment leads to less concentration. The
eﬀect of the MAI on market structure and aggregate welfare are then positive.
As a second hypothesis, multinational companies may reduce competition in
the host countries. This may be the case if multinational enterprizes drive
out national companies due to technological advantages and the realization
of scale economies. This increases eﬃciency on the one hand, but may also
lead to a higher degree of market concentration on the other. As a possible
consequence, ﬁrms may better exercise market power.17
It may be diﬃcult to assess if the liberalization of foreign investment leads
to more market concentration in general. As the following sections indicate,
there may be diﬀerences between the short run and in the long run. But
even if increased market concentration results from liberalization, one has to
consider whether ﬁrms are able to exercise market power. This depends on
market characteristics like demand elasticities, substitutability and the degree
of entry barriers. This has to be assessed case by case.
3.2 Short Term Eﬀects of Direct Investment
The last section contains two opposing statements about how a liberalization
of foreign investment might aﬀect market concentration. These statements do
not necessarily contradict each other, because short run and long run eﬀects
of increased foreign competition may be diﬀerent.
17Technological advantages lead also to lower costs, which tends to increase welfare.
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In the short run, the type of foreign investment determines which concentra-
tion eﬀects result. Unfortunately, only few studies deal with the question of
which type of market access a multinational chooses, and how this choice af-
fects market concentration in the short run.18 I will distinguish two forms as
polar cases, namely market access through merger and acquisition (M&A), and
market access through foundation of a new plant locations.19 These two types
have diﬀerent short run eﬀects on market concentration indicates. Moreover,
they are of great empirical relevance, because these two types account for a
great share of today´s direct foreign investment.20
Direct investment as foundation of new plant locations reduce market concen-
tration in the short run. New market participants enter the domestic market,
which increases the number of ﬁrms and competition. In contrast, mergers and
acquisitions may increase market concentration. Whether this is the case de-
pends on diﬀerent factors and has to be examined case by case: Suppose that a
foreign investor acquires a domestic ﬁrm. The eﬀect on market concentration
depends on the relationship between the investor and the takeover candidate
before the acquisition. If the domestic company competes with the exports of
the acquiring ﬁrm, the acquisition leads to reduced competition and increases
market concentration. If in contrast the domestic ﬁrms do not compete with
exports of the investor, market concentration is not aﬀected. It may even
decrease. Consider for instance the case where ﬁrms in the domestic market
are heterogenous: The acquired ﬁrm is small compared to its competitors and
lacks productivity in the domestic market without the investor. The acquisi-
tion may then lead to a transfer of know how and new production skills, which
increases productivity and the size of the acquired company. Thus mergers
and acquisitions may increase competition even in the short run.
The eﬀect of foreign investment on market concentration and competition de-
pends on the type of investment and speciﬁc market conditions. But which
type of investment do companies chose? This question is subject to further
research. Existing studies (compare footnote 18) indicate that the following
factors plays a role: If speed of entry plays an important role, ﬁrms prefer
foreign investment as mergers and acquisitions. This is also the case if ﬁrms
intend to stay close to a market competitor, who is already present in a mar-
ket which is strategically important. In contrast, cultural diﬀerences between
18 Compare Walter (1993), Buckley and Casson (1998), Hennart and Park (1993), Caves
and Mehra (1986) in the context of multinational enterprizes. General industrial economics
approaches towards mergers and acquisitions and their eﬀect on market structure and welfare
are for instance Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Barros and Cabral (1994) and Aydemir
and Schmutzler (2002).
19Other types are for instance licensing or franchising.
20Friedman, Gerloski and Silberman (1992), UNCTAD (1998b), and UNCTAD (2001), p.
xiii.
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the acquiring and the acquired ﬁrms tend to increase the costs of a merger.
Accordingly, if cultural diﬀerences play an important role, direct investment
as foundations of new plant locations are more likely.
3.3 Long Term Eﬀects of Direct Investment
Long run eﬀects of the MAI on market concentration depends mainly on two
aspects. First, multinational companies may be able to drive national ﬁrms
out of markets. Moreover, multinationals may ﬁnd it easier than domestic
ﬁrms to erect market entry barriers.21 The empirical evidence is ambivalent:22
Foreign investment in industrialized countries tends to decrease market con-
centration in the long run. Competition increases through direct investment,
which indicates that the MAI has positive welfare eﬀects in these countries.
In contrast, foreign investment in less developed countries (LDCs) leads to an
increase of market concentration in the long run. Multinational companies
tend to drive national companies out of markets. This is due to technological
advantages and the use of scale economies. Accordingly, the welfare eﬀect of a
broad liberalization of foreign investment in LDCs is diﬃcult to assess. Market
concentration and the exercise of market power may increase, which tends to
decrease aggregate welfare in these markets. On the other side, productivity
improvements lead to lower costs and reduce prices, which tends to increase
aggregate welfare.
A second aspect relates to the exercise of market power. The broad liberaliza-
tion of foreign investment through the MAI may have positive welfare eﬀects,
even if the market structure does not change in a speciﬁc country. This is a
contestable market argument: Suppose that the MAI does not induce more
foreign investment in a certain country. It may nevertheless improve aggre-
gate welfare there, if multinational companies overcome market barriers easier
than national companies. The mere threat to enter a market may be suﬃcient
to induce competitive pricing. In this case, prices decline and aggregate wel-
fare improves, even though the market structure remains the same. Empirical
studies show that the aspect of contestable markets may play an important
role.23
21For instance, multinationals might use transfer prices to collect proﬁts in regions with
small taxes, which gives them strategically advantages over national ﬁrms.
22Compare Dunning (1974), Kumar (1990), Ratnayake (1999), Lall (1979), Petrochilas
(1989), Jenkins (1990).
23Compare Shapiro (1983), Geroski (1991).
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3.4 Competition for Direct Investment
Governments often try to inﬂuence the location decision of companies. They
grant subsidies or loopholes for speciﬁc regulations, which tends to decrease
taxes or costs. As stated in section 2, the contents of the MAI imply that
regional competition increases. Foreign investors improve their bargaining
position against national governments. The question arises if the induced
intensiﬁcation of regional competition through the MAI improves aggregate
welfare.
The following model by Rauscher (1995) gives a basic intuition how regional
competition eﬀects aggregate welfare.24 It analyzes strategic interactions be-
tween a single multinational enterprize and representatives of various identical
regions. The multinational serves all regions, creating a consumer surplus in
each region that is independent of its production location.25 In each region,
market demand and cost conditions are identical, except possibly for emission
taxes, which increase variable costs (and thus reduce the supply of the good).
Emission taxes are set by each region in the ﬁrst stage of the game, because
production causes pollution, which is strictly local. That is, environmental
damage occurs only in the host country of the enterprize. Environmental
damage is the same in each region. Jurisdictions maximize welfare, which con-
sists of the sum of local tax revenue and local consumer surplus minus local
environmental damage. The multinational decides about the production loca-
tion in the second stage of the game, which is the region with the lowest taxes.
Finally, the multinational serves all regions from the local production plant.
The basic insight of this model is that, even in the absence of global envi-
ronmental pollution, diﬀerent market equilibria may emerge. The reason is
that environmental damage and tax revenues arise only in the host country,
whereas all countries realize consumption rents. We restrict the analysis to
two polar cases, which I entitle as ”strong regional competition” and ”not-in-
my-backyard”-politics. In the ﬁrst case, countries opt for lax environmental
regulation to attract the investment. Strong regional competition exists, and
environmental regulation is too small. In the latter case, no region wants to
bear the burden of local environmental pollution, even though production in
general is desirable. When do these cases arise?
Strong regional competition arises if local environmental pollution through
24The following description follows the survey on regional competition by Schmutzler
and Polk (2001) closely. Janeba (2000) provides an analysis which combines the view that
multinational companies beneﬁt from regional competition, with the idea that governments
may potentially exploit multinationals once an investment has been made. Compare also
the quoted literature there.
25The model assumes away transportation costs.
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production is very small. In this case, tax income from local production out-
weighs the welfare eﬀect of environmental pollution. Accordingly, each country
is interested to win the competition for the plant decision. As only the country
with the lowest regulations gets the foreign investment, all countries face in-
centives to lower regulation. Strong regional competition results, which leads
to ineﬃcient under regulation of the ﬁrm. On the contrary, if environmental
pollution is very high, disadvantages from local production exist. In this case,
tax revenue and domestic consumer welfare are not enough to outweigh envi-
ronmental pollution from local production. Each country sets high emission
taxes to deter local production. As all the countries employ this ”not-in-my-
backyard”-behavior, no production takes place in any region and consumer
welfare will not be realized. A prisoners’ dilemma results: Due to strict reg-
ulation, no investment takes place, even though production is desirable from
an aggregate welfare point of view.
As the preceding model indicates, regional competition is eﬃcient with respect
to the location decision of the multinational ﬁrm. The ﬁrm invests where envi-
ronmental regulation is small, which minimizes tax payments. But the extent
of regulation is ineﬃcient. Regulation tends to be too strict if environmental
pollution is high. If it is low, strong regional competition emerges and regula-
tion tends to be too low. This result, namely eﬃcient regulation with respect
to the location decision, but ineﬃcient regulation with regard to allocative
aspects, is relatively robust to variations of the theme.
The MAI intensiﬁes regional competition, which tends to decrease allocative
eﬃciency. In contrast, locational eﬃciency improves. In reality, these two
eﬀects have to be weighed against each other, which may be subject of further
research.
4 Propositions for a new MAI
I will develop three theses in this section:
• Foreign investment aﬀects market structure and competition. A multi-
lateral agreement on investment needs to consider these eﬀects. It can
either implement own competition rules, or explicitly state the primacy
of national competition laws.
• If a future agreement implements regulations on competition policies,
the term ”Investment” needs more careful speciﬁcation.
• A far reaching liberalization of foreign investment ﬂows can only ex-
hibit its positive eﬀects on growth, productivity and employment, if all
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countries have well functioning competition authorities. A multinational
agreement on investment should only be implemented, if it includes ac-
tive support for the creation of competition authorities in all countries,
especially in LCDs.
Before I justify these theses, let me ﬁrst state that the higher degree of re-
gional competition has no negative consequences in my opinion: I discussed
theoretical approaches concerning the eﬀect of foreign investment on compe-
tition between regions in section 3.4. The discussion concluded that no clear
statement can be made about the eﬀect of increased regional competition on
aggregate welfare. Suppose that further research indicates that tough regional
competition reduces aggregate welfare. Even then no argument in favor of
discrimination of foreign investors should be deduced. The MAI prohibits dis-
criminating behavior against foreign investors, but not a general prohibition
of certain types of investment. Accordingly, a country may impose general
investment regulations if it turns out that regional competition is bad. The
binding condition is that these aﬀect foreign and domestic ﬁrms in the same
way. For instance, a government might impose a regulation which restricts the
maximum amount of investment subsidies, or it may prohibit the construction
of new sites for nuklear energy. These types of regulation are allowed as long
as they aﬀect domestic and foreign investors in the same way. They are only
prohibited if they lead to discrimination of foreign investors against domestic
ones. And to my point of view, nothing is bad about this particular prohibition
of discrimination.
In addition, the MAI foresees a rule which implies that once granted subsidies
must be open to all investors in similar situations in the future. This rule
increases the cost of a singular subsidy substantially, because a country must
consider its expected future cost. If competition between regions turns out to
be bad, the implied higher costs of subsidies through the MAI tend to reduce
these ineﬃciencies. In sum, even if increased regional competition turns out
to decrease aggregate welfare, this should not be used to deduce arguments for
discriminating behavior against foreign investors.
4.1 Integration of Competition Policy Aspects
The detailed eﬀects of a liberalization of foreign investment on market struc-
ture and concentration depend on the speciﬁc circumstances in which foreign
investment is carried out (compare chapter 3). But it is undebatable that a
broad liberalization of foreign investment aﬀects market structure and com-
petition. Hence a multilateral agreement should consider competition policy
concerns. It should be open to rules which prevent negative competition eﬀects
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in the member states, which may be induced through the general liberalization
of foreign investment ﬂows. The draft of the MAI lacks such an approach.
The form of integration is debatable. The question is whether competition
rules should be explicitly integrated in such an agreement on a multilateral
basis. Or is it preferable to foresee a clause which acknowledges the primacy
of national competition laws, but leads the implementation and integration of
these rules to the member states? This question is subject to current debates.26
Consider for instance the following argument in favor of central competition
policy rules. The existence of multinational enterprizes leads to interdepen-
dencies between national competition policies, which gives incentives to set
competition policy strategically: A national government is interested to assure
strong competition in its domestic market, which maximizes national welfare.
But suppose that this country is the host of a multinational enterprize, which
produces in a foreign country. Moreover, suppose that its proﬁts can be trans-
ferred to the home country. Then the country beneﬁts from relatively lax
competition in the foreign country, which increases proﬁts there. Accordingly,
if countries have asymmetric political strength, countries may face incentives
to implement diﬀerent standards of competition policy in diﬀerent regions.
Welfare reducing distortions in the product markets can then be expected.27
This is an argument in favor of a central competition authority within the MAI.
But there are also arguments against it: It may be easier for interest groups
to inﬂuence a single central authority compared to several national ones, as
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) indicate. Moreover, a central authority eliminates
competition between institutions, which may not be desirable.
If the member states decide to centrally implement competition rules in the
agreement, concrete laws need to be worked out. Moreover, member states
must agree to implement an eﬀective dispute settlement body, which promotes
the factual realization and accordance to these rules. Eﬀective punishment
measures are crucial, otherwise the body would degenerate to a tiger without
teeth. On the other side, if the agreement includes rules on competition policies
at a decentral basis, competence for legislation and implementation remains
with the authorities of the member states. The agreement should then foresee
a primacy of competition concerns about the liberalization of investment. The
formulation, implementation and execution of concrete competition laws would
then be left to the authorities of the member states.
26Compare for instance Basedow (1998), Rosenthal and Nicolaides (1997), Ha¨rtel (1999),
Barros and Cabral (1994).
27Caves (1996), Chapter 4; Empirical references can be found in OECD (1974).
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4.2 Specifying the meaning of ”Investment”
As sections 3.1 to 3.3 indicate, the eﬀect of foreign investment on market
structure and competition depends on its type. Accordingly, a multilateral
agreement on investment needs to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of for-
eign investment. The deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” in the MAI is too
general. For instance, the agreement treats portfolio investment in the same
way as traditional direct investment. These two types have diﬀerent char-
acteristics, as portfolio investment are made on a short term basis, and risk
diversiﬁcation plays a crucial role. Portfolio investments entail stability risks
for the receiving country, and aﬀect corporate planning in a diﬀerent way as
long term direct investment.28 In contrast, portfolio investments do not aﬀect
market structure and competition, which direct investment does.
Long term oriented direct investment aﬀects market structure and competition
in the receiving and the host countries, which should be considered in a mul-
tilateral agreement. If a future agreement foresees the primacy of competition
laws upon the liberalization of investment ﬂows, but leaves the implementation
to the member states, a broad diﬀerentiation of the term ”Investment” seems
suitable. However, if the agreement will explicitly integrate corresponding
regulations on a multilateral basis, the term ”Investment” needs much more
detailed diﬀerentiation in order to comply with the diﬀerent eﬀects of various
investment types. As explained in section 3.2, e.g. mergers has other eﬀects
on market structure and competition, as the creation of new plant locations.
The very far-reaching and general deﬁnition of the MAI does not allow such a
diﬀerentiation. It should be extended accordingly.
4.3 Promotion of Competition Authorities in LDCs
I discuss possible negative eﬀects of foreign direct investment on LDCs in
section 3.3. The analysis hints at the increasing importance of well function-
ing and eﬃciently working competition authorities. A multilateral agreement
serves to liberalize direct investment ﬂows, with the aim to increase compe-
tition. The framework must assure that these positive eﬀects can in fact be
realized. This is not the case if increased liberalization leads to less competi-
tion. In this case, the MAI may create negative eﬀects on market structure and
competition, which decreases aggregate welfare especially in LDCs. Accord-
ingly, the implementation of a multilateral agreement on investment should
only be undertaken, if it simultaneously promotes the establishment of eﬃ-
cient competition authorities in LDCs.
28Some economists propose a tax on short term capital transactions. Compare Tobin
(1978), Frankel (1996).
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If an agreement foresees that competition policy remains in the hands of the
member states, it should be considered that many LDCs lack well function-
ing competition authorities.29 To guarantee competition in these countries, a
multilateral agreement should then promote the implementation of well func-
tioning competition authorities in LDCs. If this is not the case, negative eﬀects
on market structure and competition may result in less developed countries.
Positive eﬀects on growth and development may be weakened in these coun-
tries, and even be converted into a negative welfare eﬀects.
5 Is the WTO a suitable forum for a future
Multilateral Agreement?
If a multilateral agreement on investment will be implemented in the future:
What is a suitable forum for its realization? The OECD is not appropriate
for two reasons: First, it seems rather unlikely that the OECD resumes ne-
gotiations after its ﬁrst failure. Second, the limited sphere of inﬂuence of the
OECD speaks against this organization, as it does not represent the group of
less developed countries.
The WTO can play an important role for the integration of such an agree-
ment.30 It already has an extended mandate beyond the ﬁeld of international
trade in some respects. It touches the ﬁelds of direct investment, trade and
competition policy, in as much as these ﬁelds are linked to questions of inter-
national trade policy. Therefore an integrative and broad approach to regulate
these associated ﬁelds within the WTO seems reasonable.31 Consider for in-
stance the recent negotiations between China and the European Union for a
Chinese entry into the WTO. Access to the Chinese telecommunication market
was of special interest to the EU. So the countries agreed that European com-
panies are allowed to purchase minority stakes of Chinese telecommunication
companies of up to 49%. Remarkably, this WTO agreement essentially regu-
lates the liberalization of foreign investment, and does not exclusively refer to
mere trade policies.
The WTO has also established structures to elaborate, realize and integrate
multilateral agreements. The dispute settlement mechanisms are relatively ef-
fective. Recently, the settlement body accomplished that member states abide
to the contents of the WTO agreements.32 A dispute settling mechanism must
29Compare Basedow (1998).
30For argument in favor of an implementation within the WTO, compare Ganesan (1998).
Arguments against an implementation gives Hartwig (1999).
31Compare also OECD (1999a), OECD (1999b).
32Information on current and past proceedings can be found at
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be integrated into a multilateral agreement on investment. As its eﬀective-
ness is crucial for a good implementation, the WTO appears to be a suitable
platform.
Another advantage is that less developed countries are represented within the
WTO. Of course, their political weight and their representation in working
groups is not comparable to the US, the EU or Japan. This should be improved
with a multilateral agreement on investment, such that all countries are in fact
able to coordinate own interests and bring them forth within the WTO. Other
forums, as for example the UNCTAD, would probably better represent the
interests of LDCs. But it would be doubtful whether the member states of the
OECD agreed to such a forum.
A transfer of the MAI to the WTO generates political costs. For instance,
members of the OECD and the WTO face diﬀerent interests, as Hartwig (1999)
argues. But this is not an argument that an agreement should be restricted
to the OECD. If an agreement on investment is ever going to be implemented,
the WTO appears to be the right organization to deal with it.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/dispu status e.htm.
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